role of theory in econometrics. I conclude with some suggestions about how to do Marshallian macroeconometrics.
II. Two Critiques
The Cowles-Commission Program Econometrics rose to self-consciousness in the 1930s in part as the result of the founding of the Econometric Society. Its manifesto called for a discipline that combined economic theory and statistics as the basis for empirical economics (Frisch 1933) . Whose rites would be used to solemnize this marriage was a fraught question during the two decades after 1933.
1 Spanos (1995) argues that there were two models of statistics for economics to draw on.
The first, the theory of errors, was developed for applications in the physical sciences. It presumed a well articulated, and unquestioned, underlying theoretical model.
The statistical problem arose because repeated observations, which were never exact, had to be combined to measure unknown parameters in astronomical and geodesic applications (Stigler 1986 , ch. 1).
The second was R.A. Fisher's statistical approach to experimental design. Fisher envisaged repeated experiments in which carefully deployed controls permitted a phenomenon to be isolated except for random and unsystematic influences. The statistical problem was to identify the significance of a phenomenon against the random the background of this random variation.
Both the theory of errors and experimental design were clear about the sources of the random processes characterized through their statistics. Both were secure in their applications of probability theory because they dealt with repeated observations of what they could convincingly argue were the same phenomena. The problem for economics, especially for macroeconomic time-series data was that there were no repeated observations or repeated experiments; there was only a single history. 2 Spanos argues that Haavelmo's (1944) "Probability Approach in Econometrics"
represented a kind of union of the theory of errors and Fisher's experimental approach.
Economic theory was used to identify the relevant causal factors in economic structures viewed as a system. The complete articulation of the relevant factors stood in the place of experimental controls. 3 The economic structure could then be seen as mechanism in which each datum is a realization of a single process, much like the position of the moon measured at different times, rather than as observations from a constantly changing and incommensurable economic reality.
The Cowles Commission, particularly in its monographs of the late 1940s and early 1950s (Koopmans 1950, Hood and Koopmans 1953) developed the theory of identification to the canonical form that can still be found in econometrics textbooks. It set the stage for later developments in the techniques of structural estimation. The
Cowles-Commission approach placed great weight on more or less complete theoretical knowledge. In the classic example, data on prices and quantities are some impossible-todisentangle mixture of supply and demand. It is only when theory can convincingly discriminate between factors other than price that affect supply but not demand and vice versa that it is possible to estimate the price-elasticity of supply or of demand. 2 The term "macroeconomics" appeared at roughly the same time as "econometrics," though it is rarely found in the early econometrics literature, even when the subject is the modeling of clearly deals with what we now regard as macroeconomic data.
3 Also see Morgan (1990, ch. 8) who emphasizes identification as a substitute for controlled experiment.
For all of its stress on the critical importance of a priori theory as the source of identification, the Cowles-Commission was fairly agnostic with respect to just what the content of relevant economic theory would be. In particular, it was not thought obvious that the theory was Walrasian. Indeed, much of the theory lying behind structural models after the Cowles Commission was Keynesian in that it involved relations between aggregates at best loosely connected to explicit assumptions about individual economic behavior.
The measurement of free parameters and the identification of causes was run together in the notion of structural estimation. The Cowles Commission clearly saw econometric models as articulating causal structures (see especially Simon 1953, who explores the relationship between causality and identification). After the early 1950s, even while the Cowles-Commission program flourished, causal language rapidly disappeared from econometric discourse (see Hoover 2004a for a discussion of the
reasons)
The Lucas Critique To borrow Jevon's assessment of Ricardo: With the publication of "Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique" (1976) that able but wrong-headed man, Robert Lucas, shunted the car of economic science onto a wrong line. He faulted the typical macroeconomic theory of the day for paying too little attention to the fact that the economy comprised intentional agents, who responded to incentives and formed plans on the basis of available information. The econometric models used for policy evaluation failed to account for the fact that policy followed patterns discernible by people in the economy.
If policymakers used equations describing economic aggregates systematically to guide a change in policy, then as people's behavior responded to the new policy, the very equations used to predict its effects would no longer capture that behavior.
Lucas's initial point was neither new nor necessarily radical.
4 Since Lucas's illustrations attributed the principal source of the difficulty to the formation of expectations, a straightforward response was consistent with the Cowles-Commission program: supplement the economic theory with a good model of aggregate expectation formation (e.g., the rational-expectations hypothesis) and proceed in the usual manner.
5
Lucas did, however, have a more radical program in mind. The first element of the program was at best hinted at in "Econometric Policy Evaluation" but was clearly articulated in "Understanding Business Cycles" (Lucas 1977) Calibration takes theory to be paramount to the point of questioning the data before questioning the theory when there is a discrepancy (Prescott, 1986) . It eschews statistical estimation of parameters. And it evaluates its success by matching simulated moments of the calibrated model to the moments of data in the same spirit as the test of the Adelmans.
The Sims Critique
7 Kydland and Prescott (1982) ; Lucas (1987) . See also Hoover (1995) , Hartley, Hoover, and Salyer (1998 (1)
where Y t is an n × 1 vector of contemporaneous variables, B(L) is a polynomial in the lag operator, L; and U t is an n × 1 vector of error terms with U = [U t ], t = 1, 2, . . . , T.
It is said that there are no atheists in the foxhole. The battle for the VAR analyst is to use it for policy analysis, and that requires theoretical commitments. The problem is that the elements of U t are typically intercorrelated -that is, the covariance matrix Ω = E(UU´). is not diagonal. This means that the individual equations of the system are not causally distinct. They cannot be perturbed separately, which is what policy analysis requires. Sims initially dealt with this issue in an ad hoc fashion, suggesting that equation (1) could be orthogonalized using particular transformations (Choleski decompositions) without too much concern about which one. (His position reminds one of Dwight Eisenhower urging every American to worship . . . at the church or synagogue of his choice.) Under criticism from Cooley and LeRoy (1985) and Leamer (1985) , among others, Sims (1986) came to accept that some a priori structure had to be imposed on equation (1). In particular, this required a choice of A 0 such that
is known as the structural VAR (SVAR).
Equation (1) The relationship is two-way. In one direction, the use of SVARs is conditioned by the Lucas critique. One argument for using the SVAR was suggested early on by Sims (1982) . He conceded that Lucas's argument was correct; nonetheless, if in practice changes of policy regime were infrequent or if they could be modeled as part of a superregime in which the current regime was a realization of knowable switching process between regimes, then the SVAR could be a stable representation of the economy. This argument accounts for one of the most puzzling features of SVAR analysis -the obsessive concern for policy shocks.
Typically, the effect of monetary or fiscal policy is analyzed in an SVAR by calculating the impulse-response function -that is, by tracing out the effect of a random shock to the policy equation on all the variables of the system over time. What is odd about this is that we do not normally think of policymakers as crafting policy through the delivery of random shocks. And, in practice, the residuals of the policy equations, which give an estimate of the size of the shocks, are quite small. We normally think of policymakers as trying to affect the economy through systematic reactions to changing conditions. In a Lucasian world of rapidly clearing markets, continuous full employment, and rational expectations, systematic monetary policy would not have any effectschanging it would not matter -and shocks are the only thing that would have real effects.
The world in which the SVAR is immune from the Lucas critique is also the world in which, from the policy point of view, it does not matter whether the equations of the SVAR are stable are not. Shock analysis is legitimate when it is useless.
Over time, however, even new classical macroeconomists have come to believe that markets do not clear perfectly or quickly and that there may be deviations from rational expectations. In theory, this gives policy a handle on the real economy. But then, if the Lucas critique is correct, any systematic change in the equations representing policy reactions should be reflected in structural breaks in other equations of the SVAR.
When policy analysis is useful, the validity of the SVAR is questionable. Sims (1999) has conducted counterfactual experiments that amount to substituting one policy-reaction function for another in an SVAR. It is unclear, however, how that could be valid in the face of the Lucas critique.
The use of SVARs is conditioned by the Lucas critique. And in the other direction, users of calibrated models frequently turn to SVARs to validate the success of their models. An SVAR is estimated using the same variables as the calibrated model. Impulse-response functions are calculated from both the SVAR and the calibrated model.
The model is judged a success if, qualitatively at least, it manages to mimic the impulseresponse functions of the SVAR.
There is a strong element of casual empiricism in these exercises. Which variables are included in the SVAR depends not on which might be important in the world but on which happened to be elements for the calibrated model. Typically, these models are simultaneous, and do not possess a recursive causal ordering. Nevertheless, A 0 is typically chosen to be a triangular matrix -that is, to have a well defined recursive causal ordering. This choice is usually arbitrary or justified by an appeal to considerations such as common-sense views on relative speeds of adjustment unrelated to the theoretical implications of the model. Such a lack of seriousness about how one should connect theoretical models to empirical methods shows how far away the VAR program is in practice from Fisher's experimental design. In that methodology, the omission of a control would result in an invalid experiment. In the Cowles-Commission framework, identifying assumptions are meant to take the place of such controls. That requires a tight mapping between theory and econometric model. Here the mapping is extremely loose.
In the end the alliance between the VAR program and the Lucasian microfoundational program is essentially incoherent. The root of the problem is the reigning Walrasian methodology.
III. Two Visions

Walrasian Methodology
When David Colander (1996 Colander ( , 2004 ) calls for a post-Walrasian economics, he appears to react primarily to the Walrasian vision of what economic theory should be. This is the familiar conception of economic atoms, each maximizing its utility and/or profit subject to technological and resource constraints. The characteristic which most marks the Walrasian system is the completely generalized interdependence among competitive markets. This vision may or may not be a good starting point for a theoretical account of the economy. I am less inclined to attack it than is Colander. Adherence to Walrasian theory in its commonly accepted sense, however, does not seem to me to be the root of the problem with macroeconometrics.
Instead, where macroeconometrics goes off the rails is in adhering to Walrasian methodology in something like the sense this term is used by Milton Friedman (1949 , 1955 . Friedman characterizes Walrasian methodology as seeking photographic accuracy in its representation of reality. This may not be the most felicitous way to put the matter; for Walrasian theory is itself highly abstract. But one sees the point. The
Walrasian approach is totalizing. Theory comes first. And when it is applied to econometrics, it is taken in at the ground floor. Empirical reality must be theoretically articulated before it can be empirically observed. 8 There is a sense that the Walrasian attitude is that to know anything, one most know everything. This attitude might be called apriorism. It is already present in the Cowles-Commission program, so that in some sense reactions to the Lucas critique are a kind of Cowles-Commission Puritanism.
Apriorism suffers from a fundamental problem. How do we come to our a priori knowledge? For Austrians, such as Mises (1966) , it is not a problem, because economics is seen as a branch of deductive logic. But most macroeconomists expect empirical evidence to be relevant to our understanding of the world. If that evidence can be viewed only through totalizing a priori theory, it cannot be used to revise the theory. While theory is ideally universal -not unlike Lucas's vision of a theory without free parameters -theory is, in practice incomplete and probationary. Theory must be supplemented with particular facts to be useful. This is not, as some modern economists would have it, invidious ad hockery; it is an inevitable part of the process of acquiring empirical knowledge.
IV. Marshallian Macroeconometrics
Synthetic Microanalysis
Robert Lucas has profoundly shaped modern macroeconomics. One need not accept that the gulf between the micro and macro is in principle unbridgeable to agree that it is so in practice. In that, the microreductionist quantum physicist, Richard Feynman agrees completely with Auyang. Feynman (1995, p. 114) argues that "'solid-state physics' or 'liquid-state physics' or 'honest physics' cannot be derived from elementary analysis of the constituent particles -their relationships are too many and too complex. Practically, economics is in the same boat, and it does little good to pretend that we can do so, in principle, and that, therefore, the representative-agent model, which mimics the mathematical methods of microeconomics, but which is not microeconomics in substance, should be regarded as the standard for macroeconomics. If we wish to understand what lies beneath macroeconomic phenomenon, we need to adopt the attitude of synthetic microanalysis and dig.
Econometric Examples
What kind of macroeconometrics is compatible with synthetic microanalysis? What might Marshallian econometrics look like? I will try to hint at an answer with some illustrations.
First, consider VAR analysis. As we saw in earlier sections, VAR analysis started off as an atheoretical approach -macroanalysis without any ambitions to connect to the microeconomic. It then discovered that it required minimal structure. Subsequently, the Cochrane proposes an aggregate supply relationship:
[ ]
where y t denotes an output measure that belongs to a vector of non-monetary variables w, m t denotes a monetary policy indicator, E(.|.) is the conditional expectations operator, Ω t-1 is the information available at time t -1, and ε wt is a vector of orthogonalized, non-monetary innovations (which include the output innovation itself). 9 The term Ψ(L) is a polynomial in the lag operator L (e.g., When λ = 0, equation (4) is the famous Lucas surprise-only supply curve (see Hoover 1988) . In an economy with a Lucas supply curve, rational expectations, and clearing markets, systematic monetary policy does not affect output. When λ = 1, then equation (4) can be interpreted as the supply curve of an economy with rule-of-thumb consumers. 10 In such an economy, systematic monetary policy does affect real output.
When λ takes any other value, systematic monetary policy matters, but to different degrees. Cochrane (1998) shows -if we only knew the value of λ -how to relate the coefficients of equation (4) (embedded in the lag functions Ψ(L) and D(L)) to the estimated parameters of an SVAR such as equation (3) repeated here:
The effects of policy on the real economy differ, depending on the value of λ.
When λ = 0, a shift in policy parameters (the coefficients of the policy-reaction function that governs the behavior of m t ) would result in structural breaks in the output equation of the SVAR, equation (3). This is an example of the Lucas critique: macroeconometric relationships are not invariant in the face of policy shifts. But it really does not matter, systematic policy is ineffective, so the SVAR is not useful for policy anyway. When λ = 1, the parameters of the policy-reaction function will not play any part in the output equation of the SVAR, so that it remains stable in the face of a change in systematic policy and, in fact, measures the effect of policy on output. The irony is that the Lucas critique matters most when policy is least effective, and matters least when policy is most effective. Cochrane (1998) argued that λ, the fraction of rule-of-thumb agents, could not be identified. Hoover and Jorda (2001) show how it can be identified from using information from distinct monetary-policy regimes. Such identification requires that equation (4) be accepted as an a priori identifying assumption.
The first thing to notice is that equation (4) lacks a microfoundation -it is not derived from optimization given deep tastes and technology, either from a disaggregated microeconomic model or from a representative-agent model. One could argue that, in principle, the coefficients of Ψ(L) itself would be subject to the Lucas critique (see Cochrane 1998, p. 283) . It does, however, take a step toward articulation of the structure underlying the VAR: it models the effects of a population of two classes of agents (those with rational-expectations and those without) in a manner that would be compatible with a variety of particular models falling into broad classes.
Marshallian macroeconometrics in this case starts with some tentative theoretical presuppositions and asks, how well they do when confronted with the data? For example, the salience of the Lucas critique can be checked by examining the invariance or lack thereof of the estimated parameters of the model. Hoover and Jorda (2001) discovered some evidence for the Lucas critique in that they estimated value of λ = 0.57. Yet even at that value, which implies a close-to-even split between "rational" and rule-of-thumb agents, it can be shown through simulation that the economy would behave nearly the same as if it were completely populated by the rule-of-thumb agents.
11 The theoretical presuppositions help us to learn something about the data and to render it more useful for policy analysis, but the data also provide a check on those presuppositions. They may suggest areas in which the theory could be elaborated to better account for features of the data. For example, do either the formation of rules-of-thumb or of the ability to construct rational expectations depend on learning behavior?
Cochrane's analysis of the monetary policy highlights the interplay of a theoretical model (e.g., equation (4)) and a particular characterization of the data (e.g., equation (3)). North American macroeconomics has focused more on developing theory subject certain criteria than on the quality of the characterization of the data. In contrast, Spanos (1995) argues for an approach to econometrics that he calls probabilistic reduction. The essential point is to maximize the salience of the econometric model by searching for a representation of the data that extracts the maximal amount of statistical information from it. That representation of the data then provides a better basis on which to exercise the interpretative transformations of economic theory.
The data side of Cochrane's analysis could be addressed in the spirit of Spanos's approach. We have already commented on the arbitrariness of the identifying assumptions of the structural VAR -that is, the restrictions on A 0 . It is widely believed by VAR practitioners that these restrictions are arbitrary and must come from theory.
But, in fact, there may be statistical grounds for selecting these restrictions, at least in some cases, based on the graph-theoretic analysis of causation.
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11 Estrella and Fuhrer (1999) provide related evidence that the Lucas critique is not practically important. 12 Hoover ( In that case, data identify A 0 without an appeal to prior theory. In other cases, the class has multiple members, but statistics may nonetheless reduce the work left for the identifying theory to do. Swanson and Granger (1997) show how to apply these methods to a VAR. Demiralp and Hoover (2004) Hendry has for many years advocated a "general-to-specific approach" to econometrics. The Copenhagen approach has focused on the characterization of the long-run
properties of time-series data -its integration and cointegration properties. It has long been known that the statistics typically used in econometrics up to the 1980s was not suitable to nonstationary data. The Copenhagen approach is again a species of probabilistic reduction, decomposing time-series data into variables which move together in the long run (cointegrate) and the common trends that drive them.
There are many detailed connections between the LSE and Copenhagen approaches in their history; and their practices are strongly complementary. It is natural, therefore, to group them together. Where typically both approaches impose less prior theory than the approach to SVARs illustrated by Cochrane's policy analysis, they insist on much stronger statistical criteria. They fit very nicely into a Marshallian methodology, because, by establishing much more highly defined characterizations of the data than does the typical VAR, they can place restrictions on what characteristics an acceptable theory must have. In some cases, they may allay theoretical concerns. The
Lucas critique, for instance, can be seen as a possibility theorem: if the economy is structured in a certain way, then aggregate relations will not be invariant to changes in systematic policy. Tests of superexogeneity, based in LSE methods, have been used to test whether invariance fails in the face of policy change (for a survey, see Ericsson and Irons 1995) . That it does not in many cases provides information that the economy is not structured in the way that Lucas contemplates.
V. After Walrasian Econometrics
It is easy to complain about the failures of orthodox macroeconomics and to lay the blame on its particular narrow Walrasian theoretical conception and to see progress in greater openness to a more realistic theory. But I suggest a different diagnosis. The problem is not in Walrasian theory, but in the Walrasian attitude of apriorism. The moral problem of science is how, in the phrase of the great pragmatist philosopher C.S. Peirce , to fix belief. The failure of the Cowles-Commission program in the 1970s was less from its supposed predictive failure or the failure of its models to be invariant to policy, than from a lack of conviction on the part of macroeconomists in the soundness of its identifying assumptions. Sims responded by trying to live without theoretical convictions, but with limited success. Lucas tried to find conviction in a zealous commitment to Walrasian theory. Lucas carried the day; but, as with other cases of zealotry, there is a gap between the ideal (a macroeconomics built from individual microeconomic behaviors) and the practice (a macroeconomics that mimics the forms of microeconomics, but never deals with individuals). This zealotry has been damaging to empirical macroeconomics because it dismisses particular, useful empirical investigations, not because they are not informative, but because they do not appear in appropriate dress.
I doubt, however, that a post-Walrasian program that replaces Walrasian theory with some supposedly richer or more realistic theory will do any better. A philosophy of "anything goes" and low expectations for the possibility of discriminating between competing conclusions on a principled basis are not calculated to produce conviction or fix belief. They cannot produce a stable economics -scientifically or sociologically.
Marshallian methodology seems more calculated to fix belief and to produce workable conviction. Yes, we must start with whatever theoretical understanding we have at the moment. But all theory is tentative. It must be rigorously confronted with data. Theory and data must be mutually adjusted. Marshallian econometrics is possible, either in the familiar North American VAR framework and in the European LSE/Copenhagen framework. It is not Walrasian, because it does not start with the premise that to know anything one must know everything. It is Marshallian, not because of its specific content, but because of its attitude: to know anything, you have to dig.
